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ABSTRACT
Statistical studies on the effects of capital controls on growth have generally yielded
insigniﬁcant results. In this paper, we show that capital controls negatively affect
growth in authoritarian countries, while growth in democratic countries is insignif-
icantly affected. We also show that the adverse effects of capital controls likely
pass through the efﬁciency of investment. Our ﬁndings suggest that policy makers
should take careful account of the political context when considering the decision
to impose capital controls.
Do controls on cross border capital ﬂows depress economic growth? Recent events sug-
gest that the answer to this question is not straightforward. Countries with extensive
capital controls have displayed a wide range of growth rates, the difference between the
economic performances of China and most African nations being a case in point. Sim-
ilar differences have been observed for countries operating under liberal capital ﬂows.
For instance, some developing countries with limited capital controls experienced years
of slow growth following currency turmoil in the late 1990s while others experienced
rapid recoveries.1 The case study literature suggests a role for political institutions in
accounting for some of these variations in outcomes.2 However, the question of whether
the relationship between capital controls and growth differs across political institu-
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tional environments has not received systematic attention in a large-n context. In this
paper, we show that the relationship between capital controls and growth varies sub-
stantially depending on whether democratic or authoritarian institutions are present.
We demonstrate a signiﬁcant negative relationship between capital controls and growth
in authoritarian environments. On the other hand we show that capital controls have an
insigniﬁcant effect on growth in democracies. We also show that the adverse effects of
capital controls likely pass through the efﬁciency of investment. Our ﬁndings suggest
that policy makers should take careful account of the political context when considering
the decision to impose capital controls.
The introduction of political institutions into the debate over the growth effects of
capital controls is useful because it resolves some of the ambiguity in the capital controls
and growth literature in Economics. Previous empirical literature either indicates no
relationship between capital controls and growth (Alesina et al. 1994, Rodrik 1998,
Eichengreen andLeblang 2003) or generatesmutually contradictory results (Quinn 1997,
Arteta et al. 2001, Edwards 2001, Edison et al. 2002). Our paper resolves some of the
ambiguity in this literature by highlighting the neglected political economy dimension
of this relationship.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
While we lead off with some standard cross country growth regressions, our core analysis
is based on panel data using six non overlapping ﬁve year periods, starting from 1970.
We choose to rely more on panel analysis thanks to the concerns about the robustness
of results emerging from cross country growth regressions that have been expressed in
many recent contributions to the literature (beginning with Levine and Renelt 1992).3
Our dependent variable is the growth of average per capita GDP between successive ﬁve
year periods, and we accordingly average values of right hand side variables over ﬁve year
periods as well. We average over ﬁve years rather than use the country year as the unit
due to the extreme instability and volatility of annual GDP data. Pritchett (2000) is the
standard source referred to by economists for why averaging constitutes best practice for
growth regressions. As Pritchett puts it, “given the instability and volatility of output,
moving to shorter and shorter time periods and eliminating long period variance are
likely to entangle dynamics, speciﬁcation, endogeneity, and statistical power, which will
ultimately confuse, not clarify, issues of growth, especially in developing countries.”4
3 Cross country regressions, of course, generate a high degree of vulnerability to omitted variables
bias.
4 Pritchett (2000, p. 235) Pritchett is especially eloquent on the problem of dynamic misspeciﬁcation
that results from using periods as short as a year. In his words, “arbitrarily parsing time series into
shorter periods imposes the assumption that the dynamics are invariant across growth correlates…In
fact although some growth effects are contemporaneous, especially macroeconomic and cyclical
factors, others could take several years, such as transitional dynamics due to changes in investment
incentives, and still others could take decades, such as the impact of changes that could affect the
rate of technical progress. Some right-hand side variables could have output or growth effects at all
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Our econometric speciﬁcations are based on the standard Solow growth model, which
takes the following form:
Log GDPi,t − Log GDPi,t−1 = φt + (α − 1)Log GDPi,t−1 + x′i,tβ + ηi + νi,t , (1)
where the φt are a complete set of period speciﬁc intercepts, xi,t is a vector of covariates
of growth including capital controls, ηi refers to country dummies, and νi,t refers to the
error term. The lagged dependent variable is included to address convergence effects
(which are a major feature of the Solow model), while the coefﬁcient for lagged log of
GDP is captured by (α − 1) in order to address the presence of the same variable on
the left hand side of the equation (as part of the growth calculation). The above model
captures the growth effects of x variables until the steady state growth rate is achieved,
which is generally assumed to lie far in the future.
As may be easily seen Equation (1) is equivalent to
Log GDPi,t = φt + αLogGDPi,t−1 + x′i,tβ + ηi + νi,t . (2)
Since Equation (2) includes both the lagged dependent variable and country dummies
on the right-hand side, and since this combination is known to generate Nickell bias
which afﬂicts the lagged dependent variable and other right-hand side variables, we
difference this equation to purge the country dummies and eliminate Nickell bias.5
(This is standard practice in growth regressions.) We address remaining endogeneity by
instrumenting for differenced right-hand side variables using instrumental variables and
GMM techniques. Standard errors are clustered by country.
Our measure of capital controls is the latest (and nowwidely considered to be the best)
measure, developed by Chinn and Ito (2006). Chinn and Ito’s measure is considered
preferable to the other measures because it captures the intensity of controls, rather than
simply indicating the presence or absence of controls. (The latter is a serious problem
with the widely disseminated measure from the IMF.) For example, the Chinn and
Ito measure takes account of evasion of capital control measures via current account
transactions such as over/underinvoicing by taking account of restrictions on current
account transactions when assessing the intensity of capital controls. The measure also
takes account of the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds and the presence
of multiple exchange rates, both of which generate constraints on moving capital across
borders. By construction, the Chinn and Ito series takes a mean value of zero. While the
original series decreases in value with an increase in controls we reverse this direction
for ease of exposition. (See Chinn and Ito (2006) for further details.)
We use Przeworski and his colleagues’ well known measure of democracy called REG
(Alvarez et al. 2000).6 Across our various speciﬁcations we also use the major control
horizons-cyclical, transitional, and steady state and there is no reason to believe that these effects are
of similar magnitude, nor have the same sign, because some policy choices may lead to temporary
booms but ultimately to busts.” (Note that this latter effect is widely considered to be a possibility
when it comes to the liberalization of capital ﬂows.)
5 See Nickell (1981).
6 The data is available at http://pantheon.yale.edu/∼jac236/DATASETS.htm.
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variables used in the capital controls literature, namely, investment, inﬂation, schooling,
life expectancy, per capita GDP, and trade openness (exports + imports divided by
GDP). The data for all these variables is fromGDNGD version 7.7 In our cross country
speciﬁcationswe also use themeasure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)provided
by the Atlas Narodov Mira. The source is Easterly and Levine (1997). In our robustness
checks we also control for currency crises, using the measure of speculative pressure
provided by David Leblang (2003). We provide summary statistics in Table A.1.
RESULTS
Wepresent ourmain results in Table 1. Column 1 presents the results of a cross-sectional
speciﬁcation that employs all the controls that are widely used in the cross-sectional
growth literature. The column shows that capital controls are not signiﬁcantly associated
with average growth over the period 1970–1999. In column 2, we allow for the effect
of capital controls to be modiﬁed by the level of democracy. Row 1 of column 2 shows
the effects of capital controls in authoritarian regimes. (We reverse Przeworski’s coding
scheme for ease of exposition, so a democracy is coded as 1 and an authoritarian regime
as 0.) Row 1 displays a negative relationship between capital controls and growth in
authoritarian regimes. The relationship is signiﬁcant at the 95% level. Row 3, which
refers to the interaction term, shows that the presence of democracy signiﬁcantlymodiﬁes
this relationship in a positive direction. Manual calculation of the standard error for
capital controls in democratic settings reveals that the positive relationship between
controls and growth in democracies is signiﬁcant at the 90% level (not shown).8 As
we show below, the negative result for authoritarian regimes is robust across numerous
robustness checks, while the positive result for democracies is not robust.
Having presented some indicative cross country results we now move to the results
for our panel speciﬁcations with six ﬁve year periods. Columns 3 and 4 present the
results of ﬁrst differenced OLS speciﬁcations for authoritarian and democratic regimes,
respectively. Democracies are countries with a score of 1 on our reversed REG scale in
the preceding ﬁve year period, while authoritarian regimes are countries with scores of
less than 1. (Since we are averaging annual observations to generate the democracy score
for the ﬁve year period, a score of less than 1 indicates the presence of an authoritarian
regime at some point in the previous ﬁve year period. In 75% of the cases countries
were authoritarian for the entire ﬁve year period, while in 92% of the cases countries
were authoritarian for more than half of the ﬁve year period.) This procedure generates
roughly comparable sample sizes of democratic and authoritarian regimes, ensuring that
differences in the signiﬁcance of results across regimes are unlikely to be driven by
differences in sample size.
7 GDNGD stands for Growth Development Network Growth Database. The data is available at
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/.
8 See Brambor et al. (2005) for the formula.
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Column 3 indicates that capital controls are associated with signiﬁcantly slower GDP
growth in authoritarian environments. An increase in the intensity of capital controls of
one standard deviation reduces growth in per capita GDP by approximately 2 percentage
points in authoritarian regimes.9 Column 4, on the other hand, indicates that capital
controls are insigniﬁcantly associated with growth in democratic environments. The null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the errors cannot be rejected in an Arellano and
Bond test.
One potential concern with the above results is that capital controls are endogenous.
For instance, slow (fast) growth may generate incentives to impose controls (liberalize).
In columns 5 and 6, we address these concerns by instrumenting for the ﬁrst difference of
capital controls with the second lag of the level of capital controls. The fact that theCragg
Donald F-statistic is well above the benchmark of 10 indicates that our instrumentation
strategy does not suffer from a weak instruments problem. (See Table A.2 for ﬁrst
stage results.) Our instrumental variables regressions conﬁrm the ﬁndings of our OLS
analysis. Authoritarian regimes display a signiﬁcant negative association between capital
controls and growth (column 5) while democracies display an insigniﬁcant relationship
(column 6).
The instrumental variables regressions described above do not address two sources of
endogeneity, one emanating from the correlation between the differenced lagged depen-
dent variable and the differenced error and the second resulting from the potential
endogeneity of the control variables. In columns 7 and 8, we address the potential endo-
geneity of all right-hand side variables by using the Blundell and Bond system GMM
estimator.10 This estimator is a relatively new version of the well known Arellano and
Bond (1991) differenceGMMestimator. LikeArellano andBond, theBlundell andBond
estimator incorporates the lagged value of the dependent variable on the right-hand side.
In addition to the equations in ﬁrst differences found in Arellano and Bond, the Blundell
and Bond estimator adds a set of equations in levels. Lagged levels of right-hand side
variables are used as instruments for the differenced values of right-hand side variables,
and lagged ﬁrst differences are used as instruments for levels. (The differenced equa-
tions use all available lags of levels while the levels equations use the contemporaneous
difference and all available lags.) In addition to the Arellano and Bond assumptions of
serially uncorrelated transient errors and predetermined initial conditions, the Blundell
and Bond estimator requires the identifying assumption that country speciﬁc effects are
uncorrelated with the differenced values of the right-hand side variables. This assump-
tion is reasonable conditional on the presence of time dummies to capture technological
improvements that apply to all countries, as any correlation would imply that relative
schooling rates, life expectancies, inﬂation, or trade openness are diverging over the long
term which is implausible.
As columns 7 and 8 show, the Blundell and Bond system GMM estimator also
shows that capital controls have a signiﬁcant negative effect on growth in authoritarian
regimes. However, democracies display a positive relationship between capital controls
9 The standard deviation of the ﬁrst difference of capital controls for authoritarian regimes is 0.8.
10 See Bond et al. (2001) for technical details.
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and growth. The null hypotheses of no AR(2) and fulﬁllment of the exclusion restriction
cannot be rejected.
We can check whether the result for democracies is sensitive to the additional moment
restrictions of Blundell and Bond by rerunning the above regressions with the Arellano
and Bond estimator. The positive coefﬁcient for democracy drops to insigniﬁcance con-
ﬁrming that this is not a robust result. On the other hand, the result for authoritarian
regimes is robust to the application of the Arellano and Bond technique (see columns
1 and 2 in Table A.5).
So far we have established that there is a robust negative relationship between capital
controls and growth in authoritarian regimes, but not in democracies. In Table 2, we
address the question of why this difference may exist. Our basic procedure here is to
assess major alternative causal stories via ﬁrst differencedOLS regressions, instrumental
variables regressions, and GMM techniques just as above. While we only present OLS
regressions in the tables for reasons of space, we only accept a result in OLS as robust if
it holds across most of the above speciﬁcations. (Results for instrumental variables and
GMM estimates referred to below are presented in Tables A.3–A.5).
What causal path accounts for the results displayed inTable 1?Macroeconomic theory
suggests that capital controls should have a negative effect on growth when they have a
net depressing effect on investment.11 If this is themajor chain of causation it is plausible
that the difference between the growth effects of capital controls between regimes will
disappear, or that the coefﬁcient for capital controls will substantially change, when
we additionally control for the level of investment. However, as column 1 of Table 2
shows, the coefﬁcient for capital controls in authoritarian regimes hardly changes and
remains signiﬁcant. This result is robust to the use of both the Blundell and Bond and
Arellano and Bond GMM estimators. (The coefﬁcient for capital controls only drops to
insigniﬁcance when the second lag is used as an instrument, but this is entirely driven
by the increase in standard error when moving from OLS to instrumental variables.)
Column 3 shows that capital controls are signiﬁcantly associated with lower investment
in authoritarian regimes (at the 90% level). However, this result does not hold up across
either instrumental variables or GMM techniques.
Column 2 shows that the effect of capital controls in democracies remains insigniﬁcant
with the addition of the investment control. Instrumental variables and bothGMMtech-
niques generate the same results with the investment control as without.While OLS and
both GMM techniques show that investment is negatively inﬂuenced by capital controls
in democracies (column 4), this result does not hold up in the instrumental variables
speciﬁcation. Since the latter drop to insigniﬁcance is primarily driven by the increase in
standard error, we are willing to assign some plausibility to this result. It is conceivable
for instance that liberalization of capital ﬂows is more likely to increase investment
where such a liberalization is credible, namely in environments with checks and balances
that stand in the way of reversal (i.e., in democracies). However, the fact that this does
not translate into a signiﬁcant negative effect for controls on growth is apparent from
our core Table 1 regressions where we do not control for this effect. In sum while capital
11 Obstfeld (1998).
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controls may depress investment, support for the idea that the effects of capital controls
on growth predominantly pass through the investment channel is ambiguous at best.
This raises the question of whether the effect of capital controls passes through the
ﬁnancial crisis mechanism. Our empirical expectations here are, however, ambiguous.
As Kristin Forbes (2004a, p. 2) points out in her review of the capital controls literature
“the most frequently cited beneﬁt of capital controls is that they can reduce a coun-
try’s vulnerability to crises.” However, she goes on to add that contrary to the above
conventional wisdom most econometric analyses “generally ﬁnd a positive-instead of
negative-correlation between capital controls and the occurrence of currency crises in
both bivariate and multivariate analyses” (Forbes 2004a, p. 2). (The implication is that
capital controls may generate incentives for bad policies and provide inadequate protec-
tion from resulting crises.) Controlling for crises could thus push the effect of capital
controls on growth in either direction. Our results are similarly ambiguous. Crises are
indeed negatively associated with growth (Table 2, columns 5 and 6). However, both
OLS and Blundell and Bond speciﬁcations show that even after controlling for ﬁnan-
cial crises, capital controls continue to have a signiﬁcant negative effect on growth in
authoritarian regimes (column 5). This negative effect drops to insigniﬁcance when
we use the Arellano and Bond technique along with the crisis control, suggesting that
controls may adversely affect growth by increasing the propensity for crises. Indeed,
consistent with Forbes’ assessment of most of the econometric literature, capital con-
trols are positively correlated with crises in our dataset. (The instrumental variables
speciﬁcation also indicates that the negative effect of capital controls in authoritarian
regimes drops to insigniﬁcance, but this is driven by the increase in standard error when
moving from OLS to instrumental variables; see Table A.3 in the online version of
the paper.) As for democracies, all techniques generate the same results with the crisis
control as without. (The OLS result is presented in column 6 while the IV and GMM
results are in Tables A.3–A.5 in the online version of the paper.) Overall, we are thus
unable to conclusively demonstrate that the effects of controls pass through the crisis
channel.
Having found ambiguous support for the conventional causal channels emphasized
in the theoretical macroeconomics literature we now explore an alternative channel. We
start from the fact that the addition of the investment control does not alter the negative
effect of capital controls on growth in authoritarian regimes. As Levine and Renelt
(1992, p. 946) put it, “if we include investment, the only channel through which the
other explanatory variables can explain growth differentials is the efﬁciency of resource
allocation.” Thus, the above ﬁnding suggests that capital controls may also have micro-
economic investment productivity effects.
Kristin Forbes (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2007a, 2007b) has been at the forefront of a
novel research agenda emphasizing the efﬁciency/productivity costs of capital controls.
Forbes observes that “recent work using microeconomic and case study evidence has
been much more successful than the macroeconomic literature in documenting the costs
of capital controls” (Forbes 2004a, p. 4). She ﬁnds that capital controls in Chile made it
substantially harder for small ﬁrms to raise capital, but not for larger ﬁrms, noting that
“this inefﬁcient allocation of resources undoubtedly reduced productivity and growth in
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Chile” (Forbes 2004a, p. 4). Aside fromForbes’ work on Chile, Simon Johnson andTodd
Mitton (2002) have demonstrated a strong relationship between the stock valuation of
politically connected ﬁrms and the government’s greater ability to provide subsidies to
these ﬁrms under capital controls. In addition, Desai et al. (2004) and Auguste et al.
(2002) have emphasized the deadweight costs that are incurred when companies invest
resources into evading capital controls. As Forbes puts it, “the bottom line is that a
range of compelling microeconomic empirical evidence indicates that capital controls
can reduce market discipline and impede overall efﬁciency” (Forbes 2004a, 2004b, p. 5).
The question for us is: why should we expect these efﬁciency effects to be more
pronounced in authoritarian regimes? To answer this question we look to the political
economy literature.
First, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrate that countries with large winning
coalitions (which are primarily democracies) are likely to favor the provision of public
goods (goods that beneﬁt the entire citizenry) over the provision of private goods (goods
that exclusively beneﬁt members of the winning coalition). In the context of capital con-
trols this implies that authoritarian governments aremore likely to use the cover of capital
controls to misallocate resources to cronies at the expense of investment productivity.
Second, Acemoglu et al. (2001) show the importance of institutional checks and bal-
ances for economic growth. If institutional checks and balances serve to limit misallo-
cations of resources under the cover of capital controls, the differential growth effects
of controls in authoritarian and democratic regimes after controlling for investment
quantity are consistent with Acemoglu et al.’s causal story.
Finally, Isham et al. (1997) have conducted a cross country study of economic rates
of return of government investment projects funded by the World Bank. They ﬁnd that
economic rates of return are positively associatedwith civil liberties,which are considered
indicative of higher public accountability. This implies that democratic governments
place a relatively high priority on investment productivity. By implication democracies
should be less prone to resource misallocations that depress investment productivity
under the cover of capital controls, which is also consistent with our results.
CONCLUSION
The empirical literature on capital ﬂow liberalization by and large indicates that capital
controls are not correlated with economic growth. We present results that differ from
this view. We show that while growth in authoritarian regimes is adversely affected by
controls, growth in democracies is not affected. We also ﬁnd that the effects of capital
controls likely pass through the investment productivity channel.
Our ﬁndings leave some important questions unanswered. The most signiﬁcant of
these relates to the precise causal links in the negative relationship between capital
controls and growth in authoritarian regimes when we control for investment. While
we provide some theoretical possibilities and cite some cutting edge research, a precise
empirical conclusion demands collecting more micro-level data across a much wider
range of countries. We consider this to be the logical next step of our research program.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1. Summary statistics.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel summary statistics
GDP growth 318 0.0645 0.129 −0.396 0.721
Capital controls 318 0.0630 1.37 −2.60 1.77
Log GDP p.c. 318 8.47 1.05 5.72 10.3
Democracy 318 0.616 0.464 0 1
Secondary schooling 318 1.50 1.14 0.0360 5.088
Inﬂation 318 61.5 298 −27.1 3360
Trade openness 318 63.6 32.5 12.9 197
Life expectancy 318 65.1 10.9 34.7 80.2
Log(Investment) 310 2.99 0.316 1.57 4.08
Financial crisis 299 0.211 0.408 0 1
Cross section summary statistics
GDP growth 84 0.0151 0.0184 −0.0468 0.0587
Capital controls 84 −0.159 1.09 −2.60 1.72
Democracy 84 0.532 0.408 0 1
Initial period GDP 84 8.11 0.953 6.10 9.71
Secondary schooling 84 1.33 1.05 0.0701 4.469
Inﬂation 84 62.1 190 −2.05 1160
Life expectancy 84 61.8 11.2 35.6 77.7
Trade openness 84 63.1 30.0 15.5 161
Ethnic frag. 84 40.5 29.4 0 90
Table A.2. First stage for instrumental variables results in Table 1.
Authoritarian Democratic
Twice lagged capital controls −0.288 −0.194
(0.0592) (0.0351)
Lagged Log GDP p.c. −0.0526 0.782
(0.370) (0.695)
Secondary schooling −0.497 −0.128
(0.339) (0.103)
Inﬂation −0.0000291 0.000295
(0.0000556) (0.000235)
Trade openness 0.00293 −0.00672
(0.00544) (0.00699)
Life expectancy 0.00476 0.292
(0.0244) (0.0961)
CD F-stat 30.34 17.57
N 164 154
Robust Standard Errors clustered on country in parentheses. Constant
terms not reported.
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